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ESTABLISHING A MARRIAGE LIKE RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THE 
SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE WAS A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHICH CREATED A MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY IN THE 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
On October 5, 1984, the Plaintiff/Respondent, Helen Jane 
Walters, and the Defendant/Appellant, Lewis Mark Walters, were 
married. On November 10, 1987, the parties separated. The trial 
court established that a marital relationship began on or about 
January 1, 1980. (R.99). 
From this established date, the Court divided the 
property which was acquired or paid for by the parties. (R.101). 
Such division of property resulted in a manifest injustice to the 
Defendant. 
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During the course of the trial, the Plaintiff went to 
great lengths to establish that a marital relationship took place 
years before the marriage was actually solemnized. The Court in 
fact did determine that a marital relationship began on or about 
January 1, 1980. (R.99, 150-152). From this date the Court divided 
the marital property to approximate "a near equal division of the 
monetary values of the properties." (R.160). Such division of 
property failed to adequately credit the Defendant for the separate 
property that he brought into the marriage. 
The Plaintiff argues that the trial Court neither 
explicitly nor implicitly attempted to legitimize the parties 
common law relationship and did not apply §30-1-4.5, Utah Code 
Annotated, Utah's "common law marriage" statute. It is evident, 
however, from the course of the proceedings and the Court's 
decision, that a common law marriage was indeed established on 
January 1, 1980, which had a significant bearing on the division 
of property. The facts and conduct of the Court are significantly 
different than Barber v. Barber, 134 Utah Adv. Rpt. 26 (Utah App. 
1990) which the Plaintiff points to. In Barber the trial Court did 
not find a marital relationship prior to the marriage being 
solemnized and did not use such finding in the distribution of the 
property. 
From the Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 15, 
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1987, (R.99-100) a number of factors were considered in determining 
that a marital relationship began on or about January 1, 1980. The 
Court considered Mthe fact that the Defendant stayed in the 
Plaintiff's trailer with her when he was not working out of state. 
The Defendant had the Plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which 
he was paying forf and did not charge rent. The Plaintiff made 
improvements on the property such as would be expected of a married 
couple. The Defendant paid debts and obligations for the Plaintiff 
including substantial debts to the IRS and the State Tax 
Commission. The Plaintiff's child with the Defendant's consent was 
enrolled in school under the name Walters. While working out of 
state, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff money to live on." (R.99-
100) . 
Having considered the parties to have begun their marital 
relationship on January 1, 1980, the Court awarded the Plaintiff 
her share of the Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the 
existence of the marriage. According to the formula outlined in 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P2d 199 (Utah App. 1987). (R.100). 
Then, having considered when the real properties were obtained, and 
how they were paid for, the Court divided the real property. 
(R.101). 
The Defendant disagrees with the Court's finding that a 
marital relationship began in 1980. Before the solemnization of 
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the marriage, the parties rarely lived with each other as the 
Defendant was living out of state working on TDY assignments. The 
Defendant only made infrequent returns to Utah. The Defendant also 
argues that the trial Court clearly abused its discretion in 
distributing the property. Primarily, it was inequitable to award 
the Plaintiff a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued 
prior to October 5, 1984, (the date the marriage was solemnized) 
and the Pleasant Grove real property acquired by the Defendant 
prior to this date. 
The Defendant recognizes that under proper circumstances, 
premarital or separate property may "be subject to equitable 
division upon divorce". Barber, supra at 26. However, under the 
particular circumstances at hand, the circumstances were not proper 
to award the Plaintiff a share of the Defendant's retirement 
benefits earned and the real property acquired by the Defendant 
prior to the solemnization of the marriage. 
There is no equitable reason to award the Defendant a 
share of Defendant's retirement benefits earned prior to October 
5, 1984. The Court clearly recognized a common law marriage by 
awarding such. Under the holdings of Layton v. Layton, 777 P2d 
504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the trial court's order in this matter was 
clearly erroneous. Utah's common law marriage statute, §30-1-4.5, 
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Utah Code Annotated, did not become effective until 1987 and is not 
to be applied retroactively. 
It can be imputed that the same rationale was used by the 
Court in awarding the real property. The Court's Memorandum 
Decision states that a primary consideration was "when the 
properties were obtained.11 (R.101). With this in mind, the Court 
divided the realty in a way it believed approximated "a near equal 
division of the monetary values of the properties." (R.160). It 
is evident that the Court did not treat the property in question 
as premarital or separate property but as marital property. 
"As a general rule, equity requires that each party 
retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage." 
Hamont v. Hamont, 135 Utah Adv.Rpt. 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P2d 907, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This 
general rule is to be followed unless there are unique 
circumstances. The circumstances relied on by the trial court in 
the instant case were not unique in nature to merit awarding the 
Plaintiff the property in Pleasant Grove free and clear. (R.101). 
Such property was acquired by the Defendant in May of 1980 prior 
to the marriage. The Plaintiff was permitted to move her trailer 
onto this property rent free. When the Defendant was on temporary 
duty (TDY) assignments, the Plaintiff arranged for making physical 
improvements to the Defendant's realty pursuant to his 
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instructions. (R.151). Such improvements were all paid for by the 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff derived great benefit from living on said 
property prior to the marriage. In addition to not being charged 
rent by the Defendant, she also benefited greatly from 
contributions made by the Defendant in paying off debts and 
expenses she had incurred. She also received monies from the 
Defendant when he was on TDY assignments. The circumstances were 
not unique in nature to merit awarding the Plaintiff an equitable 
interest in the Pleasant Grove property in question. The 
distribution made by the trial court resulted in a "manifest 
injustice or inequity" with regards to the Defendant's premarital 
property. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P2d 1369, 1373 (1988). 
CONCLUSION 
The property division made by the trial Court manifests 
an injustice and inequity toward the Defendant. He earned and 
acquired retirement benefits and real property prior to the 
solemnization of the marriage between the parties. The Plaintiff 
was not entitled to an equitable interest in such benefits or 
property. 
It is clear that the trial Court recognized that a 
marital relationship was established in 1980 though the parties 
were not married until 1984. Though the Court never specifically 
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referred to Utah's common law marriage statute §30-1-4.5, Utah Code 
Annotated, it is evident that the Court recognized the marital 
relationship established in 1980 in distributing the property. 
§30-1-4.5 did not become effective until 1987, and according to 
Layton, supra, it is not to have retroactive effect. 
As a result of the trial Court's property distribution, 
the Defendant was not adequately credited the separate property of 
which he brought into the marriage. The circumstances were 
insufficient and not unique in nature to award the Plaintiff an 
equitable interest. Her efforts were insubstantial in contributing 
to the enhancement of the Defendant's separate property as the 
Defendant paid for all of the improvements and authorized and 
instructed the Plaintiff to make the appropriate arrangements. 
The objective of a property distribution is to achieve 
a fair, just and equitable result in a divorce action. The 
Defendant/Appellant prays this Court to hold that the District 
Court abused its discretion in distributing the property which 
resulted in a manifest injustice and inequity. It is appropriate 
for this case to be remanded for proper distribution of the real 
property and retirement benefits acquired by the Defendant prior 
to the solemnization of the marriage. 
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DATED this JJ£ day of August, 1990. 
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